Many in the Ontario business community were surprised when the Ontario Court of Appeal held in 2006 that the limitation period for demand promissory notes began to run as soon as the note was issued and not following a default after a demand for payment. This meant that demand notes issued after January 1, 2004 (when the basic limitation period was changed from 6 years to 2 years) became statute-barred 2 years from the date they were issued unless the debtor paid interest or principal or acknowledged the debt in writing. In those cases, the clock on the limitation period restarted after that event.
However, there were many situations, where payments of interest or principal would not be made for many years. For example, in the case of Hare v. Hare, a mother was unable to sue her son on a demand note when her statement of claim was issued more than 6 years after her son's last payment, although it was only a few months after she had demanded payment.
As a result, lawyers were forced to revise their demand notes to draft around the Court's decision. But such creative drafting did not resolve the problem that existed with notes that were already outstanding. As a result of intensive lobbying by various groups, the Ministry of the Attorney General enacted amendments to the Limitations Act which took effect on November 27, 2008.
The amendments make 2 significant changes directed at the decision in Hare. First, for demand obligations, the 2 year limitation period starts to run on "the first day on which there is a failure to perform the obligation, once a demand for the performance is made".
Second, the amendments apply "in respect of every demand obligations created on or after January 1, 2004" thus giving the amendments retroactive effect to the date that the new Act came into force. Now, until there is a default following a demand for payment, the limitation period doesn't start to run.
Regards,
Blair
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Freelance Writers Settle for Big Bucks
CTVglobemedia Inc., Thompson Reuters Canada and The Gale Group have recently agreed to pay an $11 million settlement in a class-action lawsuit commenced in 1996 by freelance writer Heather Robinson. The case originated with Robinson, who disputed the fact that the Globe & Mail newspaper had included articles she submitted to the Globe's print edition into electronic databases without paying her what she felt was paid proper compensation for doing so.
Robinson, a founding member of the Professional Writers Association of Canada, submitted articles to the Globe for the newspapers print edition that were then included in three electronic data bases: InfoGlobe Online; an electronic version of the Canadian Periodical Index; as well as in a CD ROM that contained a years' worth of several Canadian newspapers. Robertson filed the class action lawsuit over the unauthorized reproduction of her work as well as that of thousands of other freelance writers.
In 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that newspapers and magazines do not have the right to transfer articles from their print editions into electronic databases without the consent of the writers, ruling that the databases resulted in "a different product that infringes" the creator's copyright. However, the Court did make an allowance for CD ROMs that present articles in the same overall look of the printed newspapers or magazines.
The Supreme Court of Canada held, in a 5 - 4 decision, that newspaper publishers are not entitled to republish freelance articles acquired for publication in their newspapers in electronic databases without compensating the authors and obtaining their consent. Newspaper publishers have a copyright in their newspapers pursuant to the Copyright Act to "reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever". The court held that a substantial part of a newspaper may consist only of the original selection so long as the "essence" of the newspaper is preserved. In online databases, the originality of the freelance articles is reproduced but the originality of the newspaper is not. The resulting collective work is of a different nature than the original newspaper.
By contrast, the Court held that CD ROMs, which were essentially a compendium of daily newspaper editions, remained faithful to the essence of the original work - (that line could be a direct quote from Colonel Jack Ripper in Dr. Strangelove).
Regards,
Blair
Robinson, a founding member of the Professional Writers Association of Canada, submitted articles to the Globe for the newspapers print edition that were then included in three electronic data bases: InfoGlobe Online; an electronic version of the Canadian Periodical Index; as well as in a CD ROM that contained a years' worth of several Canadian newspapers. Robertson filed the class action lawsuit over the unauthorized reproduction of her work as well as that of thousands of other freelance writers.
In 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that newspapers and magazines do not have the right to transfer articles from their print editions into electronic databases without the consent of the writers, ruling that the databases resulted in "a different product that infringes" the creator's copyright. However, the Court did make an allowance for CD ROMs that present articles in the same overall look of the printed newspapers or magazines.
The Supreme Court of Canada held, in a 5 - 4 decision, that newspaper publishers are not entitled to republish freelance articles acquired for publication in their newspapers in electronic databases without compensating the authors and obtaining their consent. Newspaper publishers have a copyright in their newspapers pursuant to the Copyright Act to "reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever". The court held that a substantial part of a newspaper may consist only of the original selection so long as the "essence" of the newspaper is preserved. In online databases, the originality of the freelance articles is reproduced but the originality of the newspaper is not. The resulting collective work is of a different nature than the original newspaper.
By contrast, the Court held that CD ROMs, which were essentially a compendium of daily newspaper editions, remained faithful to the essence of the original work - (that line could be a direct quote from Colonel Jack Ripper in Dr. Strangelove).
Regards,
Blair
Thursday, May 7, 2009
Letters of Intent may be Binding Contracts
The Ontario Court of Appeal has awarded a spurned purchaser of a business damages equivalent to his loss of financial benefit for the first seven months in which he would have operated the business. In doing so, the Court increased the trial judge's award by four months.
In the case of Wallace v. Allen, the parties after some weeks of negotiation, entered into a "letter of intent" for the purchase by Mr. Wallace of four companies owned by Mr. Allen and his wife. During the next few months, Mr. Wallace began to attend at the business premises daily with a view to learning the business, getting to know the customers and staff of the business and doing everything necessary to provide a smooth transition of the ownership of the business from Mr. Allen.
The parties signed a letter of intent which read in part:
It is also agreed by the parties that there will be much legal work to be done upon acceptance by both sides and that the wording of this agreement may alter somewhat...
This letter of intent must be reduced into a binding agreement of purchase and sale by the parties within the next 40 days.
Within weeks of signing the letter of intent, Mr. and Mrs. Allen held a special employee meeting where Mr. Allen announced his retirement and the fact that he had sold his company and that the deal was "solid". Mr. Allen introduced Mr. Wallace to his employees, customers and business contacts as the "new owner" of the business. However, on the morning that the transaction was set to close, Mr. and Mrs. Allen refused to complete the transaction.
The trial judge fixed Mr. Wallace's damages at $240,000.00 representing his loss of financial benefit for the first three months of operation of the business. The trial judge found that Mr. Wallace had mitigated his damages by purchasing another business, although his evidence was that he had ample resources to fund both deals.
On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal increased Mr. Wallace's damage award to seven months. The Court found that the clauses referred to in the letter of intent contemplated and expressed an intention on the part of the parties to be bound by its terms which were to be incorporated into a more formal document.
The parties used the language of contract - they used terms such as "it is agreed" and "upon acceptance" and "this agreement" which indicated an intention to be bound upon the signing of the letter of intent.
In addition, the conduct of the parties after signing the letter of intent clearly demonstrated that they considered themselves legally bound to its terms . For several months, the parties conducted themselves as though they had a deal and the parties showed up at the lawyer's office prepared to sign the share purchase agreement.
The Court rejected Mr. Wallace's claim for specific performance of the share purchase agreement. It held that while the company itself may be unique in what it does (the argument can be made that every business is unique) Mr. Wall,ace's acquisition of the business was not - he acquired business for a living. In any event, it was nearly four years after the deal was scheduled to close and that delay in time made damages a more appropriate remedy.
In awarding seven months damages, the Court found that three months was simply not enough time for a business person to search out and find another opportunity, negotiate a new agreement of purchase and sale and close that transaction.
Regards,
Blair
In the case of Wallace v. Allen, the parties after some weeks of negotiation, entered into a "letter of intent" for the purchase by Mr. Wallace of four companies owned by Mr. Allen and his wife. During the next few months, Mr. Wallace began to attend at the business premises daily with a view to learning the business, getting to know the customers and staff of the business and doing everything necessary to provide a smooth transition of the ownership of the business from Mr. Allen.
The parties signed a letter of intent which read in part:
It is also agreed by the parties that there will be much legal work to be done upon acceptance by both sides and that the wording of this agreement may alter somewhat...
This letter of intent must be reduced into a binding agreement of purchase and sale by the parties within the next 40 days.
Within weeks of signing the letter of intent, Mr. and Mrs. Allen held a special employee meeting where Mr. Allen announced his retirement and the fact that he had sold his company and that the deal was "solid". Mr. Allen introduced Mr. Wallace to his employees, customers and business contacts as the "new owner" of the business. However, on the morning that the transaction was set to close, Mr. and Mrs. Allen refused to complete the transaction.
The trial judge fixed Mr. Wallace's damages at $240,000.00 representing his loss of financial benefit for the first three months of operation of the business. The trial judge found that Mr. Wallace had mitigated his damages by purchasing another business, although his evidence was that he had ample resources to fund both deals.
On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal increased Mr. Wallace's damage award to seven months. The Court found that the clauses referred to in the letter of intent contemplated and expressed an intention on the part of the parties to be bound by its terms which were to be incorporated into a more formal document.
The parties used the language of contract - they used terms such as "it is agreed" and "upon acceptance" and "this agreement" which indicated an intention to be bound upon the signing of the letter of intent.
In addition, the conduct of the parties after signing the letter of intent clearly demonstrated that they considered themselves legally bound to its terms . For several months, the parties conducted themselves as though they had a deal and the parties showed up at the lawyer's office prepared to sign the share purchase agreement.
The Court rejected Mr. Wallace's claim for specific performance of the share purchase agreement. It held that while the company itself may be unique in what it does (the argument can be made that every business is unique) Mr. Wall,ace's acquisition of the business was not - he acquired business for a living. In any event, it was nearly four years after the deal was scheduled to close and that delay in time made damages a more appropriate remedy.
In awarding seven months damages, the Court found that three months was simply not enough time for a business person to search out and find another opportunity, negotiate a new agreement of purchase and sale and close that transaction.
Regards,
Blair
Monday, April 27, 2009
Do we have a Privacy Interest in our Garbage?
Residents of Toronto are familiar with the debate that can be generated by garbage, but not necessarily this kind of debate. In a case recently decided, the Supreme Court of Canada held that it was lawful for the police to use evidence of criminal activity taken from the contents of a person's garbage to obtain a warrant to seize the person's house and garage. As a result of the search, the police uncovered evidence that the defendant was operating an ecstasy lab in his home. He was subsequently convicted of several criminal offences.
The defendant appealed his conviction on the basis that by taking the garbage bags from his property, the police breached his right, guaranteed by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the defendant's appeal and upheld his conviction. The Court's reasoning was as follows.
Mr. Justice Ian Binnie, writing for the majority of the Court, commented that labels are sometimes misleading. To describe something as "garbage" tends to presuppose the point in issue, namely whether the homeowner had any continuing privacy interest in what he had thrown out. The Court concluded that it is possible that the homeowner might have no further interest in physical possession of the garbage but a very strong interest in keeping private the information contained in the garbage. The question was whether he dealt with the garbage in such a way as to forfeit any reasonable expectation of keeping its contents confidential.
The Court concluded that this is an objective test to be determined considering the following factors:
1. The subject matter of the alleged search - Justice Binnie held that the subject matter is not simply garbage. He observed that residential waste includes an enormous amount of personal information about what is going on in our homes. The Court agreed with counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association that a garbage bag may more accurately be described as a bag of "information" whose contents paint a fairly accurate and complete picture of a householder's activities and lifestyle. According to the Supreme Court, many of us may not wish to disclose those things to the public generally or to the police in particular. As a result, it concluded that the defendant had a continuing direct interest in the "information" that was in his garbage.
2. Concealing illegal objects - The Court held that the issue ought to be framed in terms of privacy of the area or thing being searched and the potential impact of the search on the person being searched, and not in terms of the nature or the identity of the concealed items. The seized garbage bags contained a lot of personal items other than drug making paraphernalia. Accordingly, the physical search was not confined to evidence of criminal activity, but to other activity as well.
3. Subjective expectation of privacy - The Court held that this is not a high hurdle - obviously, subjectively the defendant expected that the contents of the garbage bags would remain private.
4. Objective expectation of privacy - The Court held that the defendant had no objective expectation of privacy because the garbage was put out for collection in a customary location, it was at or near the property line, there was no manifestation of any continuing assertion of privacy or control (such as a locked receptacle) and the police took the bags to search for information as part of a continuing criminal investigation. However, it held that apart from the key issue of abandonment, the circumstances favoured the defendant.
5. The place where the search occurred - The essence of the defendant's complaint was the intrusion by the police into activities taking place inside his home rather than the fact that the police invaded the air space at the foot of his garden by reaching across the lot line for the bags. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the implication of focusing privacy protection is on people not places. But because the garbage at the property line was accessible to passers by, the Court found that the physical intrusion by the police was relatively peripheral.
6. Whether the subject matter of the search was in public view - The garbage bags were in plain view, but their contents were not.
7. Whether the subject matter of the search had been abandoned - Clearly the defendant intended to abandon his proprietary interest in the physical objects themselves. The question is whether he had a reasonable and continuing privacy interest in the information which the contents revealed to the police.
8. Whether the information was already in the hands of third parties - The Court held that it was not necessary to defer a finding of abandonment until the garbage had been picked up by garbage collectors because this step did not depend on any act of the defendant and would add little in the way of protection.
9. Was the police conduct intrusive in relation to the privacy interest - Given that the act of abandonment occurred prior to the police gathering the garbage bags there was no privacy interest in existence at the time of the police intervention which therefore did not constitute an intrusion into an existing privacy interest.
The Court found that having regard to all of these factors, that the defendant had abandoned his privacy interest in the contents of the garbage bag when he placed them at his property line for collection. The taking of the bags did not constitute a search and seizure within the scope of section 8 of the Charter and the evidence found by the police was admissible.
Regards,
Blair
The defendant appealed his conviction on the basis that by taking the garbage bags from his property, the police breached his right, guaranteed by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the defendant's appeal and upheld his conviction. The Court's reasoning was as follows.
Mr. Justice Ian Binnie, writing for the majority of the Court, commented that labels are sometimes misleading. To describe something as "garbage" tends to presuppose the point in issue, namely whether the homeowner had any continuing privacy interest in what he had thrown out. The Court concluded that it is possible that the homeowner might have no further interest in physical possession of the garbage but a very strong interest in keeping private the information contained in the garbage. The question was whether he dealt with the garbage in such a way as to forfeit any reasonable expectation of keeping its contents confidential.
The Court concluded that this is an objective test to be determined considering the following factors:
1. The subject matter of the alleged search - Justice Binnie held that the subject matter is not simply garbage. He observed that residential waste includes an enormous amount of personal information about what is going on in our homes. The Court agreed with counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association that a garbage bag may more accurately be described as a bag of "information" whose contents paint a fairly accurate and complete picture of a householder's activities and lifestyle. According to the Supreme Court, many of us may not wish to disclose those things to the public generally or to the police in particular. As a result, it concluded that the defendant had a continuing direct interest in the "information" that was in his garbage.
2. Concealing illegal objects - The Court held that the issue ought to be framed in terms of privacy of the area or thing being searched and the potential impact of the search on the person being searched, and not in terms of the nature or the identity of the concealed items. The seized garbage bags contained a lot of personal items other than drug making paraphernalia. Accordingly, the physical search was not confined to evidence of criminal activity, but to other activity as well.
3. Subjective expectation of privacy - The Court held that this is not a high hurdle - obviously, subjectively the defendant expected that the contents of the garbage bags would remain private.
4. Objective expectation of privacy - The Court held that the defendant had no objective expectation of privacy because the garbage was put out for collection in a customary location, it was at or near the property line, there was no manifestation of any continuing assertion of privacy or control (such as a locked receptacle) and the police took the bags to search for information as part of a continuing criminal investigation. However, it held that apart from the key issue of abandonment, the circumstances favoured the defendant.
5. The place where the search occurred - The essence of the defendant's complaint was the intrusion by the police into activities taking place inside his home rather than the fact that the police invaded the air space at the foot of his garden by reaching across the lot line for the bags. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the implication of focusing privacy protection is on people not places. But because the garbage at the property line was accessible to passers by, the Court found that the physical intrusion by the police was relatively peripheral.
6. Whether the subject matter of the search was in public view - The garbage bags were in plain view, but their contents were not.
7. Whether the subject matter of the search had been abandoned - Clearly the defendant intended to abandon his proprietary interest in the physical objects themselves. The question is whether he had a reasonable and continuing privacy interest in the information which the contents revealed to the police.
8. Whether the information was already in the hands of third parties - The Court held that it was not necessary to defer a finding of abandonment until the garbage had been picked up by garbage collectors because this step did not depend on any act of the defendant and would add little in the way of protection.
9. Was the police conduct intrusive in relation to the privacy interest - Given that the act of abandonment occurred prior to the police gathering the garbage bags there was no privacy interest in existence at the time of the police intervention which therefore did not constitute an intrusion into an existing privacy interest.
The Court found that having regard to all of these factors, that the defendant had abandoned his privacy interest in the contents of the garbage bag when he placed them at his property line for collection. The taking of the bags did not constitute a search and seizure within the scope of section 8 of the Charter and the evidence found by the police was admissible.
Regards,
Blair
Friday, April 3, 2009
Pension Reform in the Ontario Budget
My pension law partner, Priscilla Healy reports:
The Ontario budget promises some welcome flexibility for both pension plan members and employers, although at the expense of benefit security on retirement.
Pension plan members who have transferred their pension monies into LIFs or LRIFs will be able to immediately withdraw 50 % of their locked-in monies from these accounts, an increase from 25%., effective January 1, 2010. There will also be a temporary waiver of fees for unlocking those accounts on the grounds of financial hardship, effective for applications made on or after April 1, 2009. However, without amendments to the tax rules, once monies are withdrawn, there will be no ability to replenish those accounts on a tax deferred basis.
Employers will welcome the ability to extend solvency payments over ten years instead of the current five year requirement, starting with valuation reports on or after September 30, 2008. The new ability to consolidate existing solvency payment schedules and to defer new going concern and solvency special payments for one year will also help temporarily cash-strapped employers.
The ten year extension of solvency payments may be illusory for any but jointly governed plans, because it will not be available if more than one-third of the aggregate of plan members object. It is not clear why retirees or deferred vested plan members would not object to a reduction in the security of their pensions. Employers may have to depend upon the inertia of retirees and deferred vested plan members preventing a flood of objections, or upon the concern of retirees or those close to retirement as to the possible insolvency of the employer which could leave them with no retiree medical benefits.
On the flip side, to protect member security the budget proposes restrictions on employer contribution holidays for fiscal years ending in 2010 to 2012.
There are a number of other budget proposals arising from the November, 2008 Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions, and there is reference to the passage of Bill 133 that simplifies pension splitting on marriage breakdown. The intent is also expressed to adopt a new multi-jurisdictional agreement that will simplify the administration of registered pension plans with members in more than one jurisdiction.
This is the first time since the abortive Bill 198 in 2002 that an Ontario government has attempted significant reforms of the Pension Benefits Act.
Regards,
Blair
The Ontario budget promises some welcome flexibility for both pension plan members and employers, although at the expense of benefit security on retirement.
Pension plan members who have transferred their pension monies into LIFs or LRIFs will be able to immediately withdraw 50 % of their locked-in monies from these accounts, an increase from 25%., effective January 1, 2010. There will also be a temporary waiver of fees for unlocking those accounts on the grounds of financial hardship, effective for applications made on or after April 1, 2009. However, without amendments to the tax rules, once monies are withdrawn, there will be no ability to replenish those accounts on a tax deferred basis.
Employers will welcome the ability to extend solvency payments over ten years instead of the current five year requirement, starting with valuation reports on or after September 30, 2008. The new ability to consolidate existing solvency payment schedules and to defer new going concern and solvency special payments for one year will also help temporarily cash-strapped employers.
The ten year extension of solvency payments may be illusory for any but jointly governed plans, because it will not be available if more than one-third of the aggregate of plan members object. It is not clear why retirees or deferred vested plan members would not object to a reduction in the security of their pensions. Employers may have to depend upon the inertia of retirees and deferred vested plan members preventing a flood of objections, or upon the concern of retirees or those close to retirement as to the possible insolvency of the employer which could leave them with no retiree medical benefits.
On the flip side, to protect member security the budget proposes restrictions on employer contribution holidays for fiscal years ending in 2010 to 2012.
There are a number of other budget proposals arising from the November, 2008 Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions, and there is reference to the passage of Bill 133 that simplifies pension splitting on marriage breakdown. The intent is also expressed to adopt a new multi-jurisdictional agreement that will simplify the administration of registered pension plans with members in more than one jurisdiction.
This is the first time since the abortive Bill 198 in 2002 that an Ontario government has attempted significant reforms of the Pension Benefits Act.
Regards,
Blair
Bank Liability for Forged Cheques
My insolvency law partner John Varley reports:
Companies victimized by forgery routinely get no support from their bankers, unless they have reported the discrepancy within the usual 30-day "monthly statement objection" period. A recent court decision may cause banks to reassess that stance, depending on the language used in the relevant account operating agreement.
In a recent case before a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, an office manager forged $186,488 of cheques and the employer company sued to recover that amount after the bank cleared all those cheques and debited the company's account.
The Court held that the bank was strictly liable for honouring the forged cheques, and that no defence was available to it. The bank's honouring of the cheques was not a mere "error, omission or irregularity", but a violation of section 48 of the Bills of Exchange Act. If (as is the case with language used by other bank agreement forms) the account agreement in this case had been more broadly worded, or had specifically mentioned forgeries, a defence would have existed, but none was available here.
Nor did the mutual negligence (of both the bank and the company) resolve the matter. The Court held that the company owed the bank no duty (at the level of due care that would have detected the forgeries) to examine the monthly bank statements and report discrepancies within the 30-day notification period stipulated by the account operating contract. Nor did it owe the bank any duty to maintain internal accounting controls to minimize or prevent forgery losses.
Regards,
Blair
Companies victimized by forgery routinely get no support from their bankers, unless they have reported the discrepancy within the usual 30-day "monthly statement objection" period. A recent court decision may cause banks to reassess that stance, depending on the language used in the relevant account operating agreement.
In a recent case before a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, an office manager forged $186,488 of cheques and the employer company sued to recover that amount after the bank cleared all those cheques and debited the company's account.
The Court held that the bank was strictly liable for honouring the forged cheques, and that no defence was available to it. The bank's honouring of the cheques was not a mere "error, omission or irregularity", but a violation of section 48 of the Bills of Exchange Act. If (as is the case with language used by other bank agreement forms) the account agreement in this case had been more broadly worded, or had specifically mentioned forgeries, a defence would have existed, but none was available here.
Nor did the mutual negligence (of both the bank and the company) resolve the matter. The Court held that the company owed the bank no duty (at the level of due care that would have detected the forgeries) to examine the monthly bank statements and report discrepancies within the 30-day notification period stipulated by the account operating contract. Nor did it owe the bank any duty to maintain internal accounting controls to minimize or prevent forgery losses.
Regards,
Blair
Women in Private Legal Practice
The Law Society of Upper Canada, the body that regulates lawyers and paralegals in Ontario, has introduced an initiative called "The Justicia Project" designed to support the retention and advancement of women lawyers in private practice. The initiative is the first of its kind in Canada and is a 3 year pilot project involving a group of law firms who have committed to sharing best practices and adopting programs to support women lawyers within their firms. The participants in the project have pledged to recognize the value of women lawyers in their firms and the importance of "balance, flexibility, mentorship, leadership and strong business management practices and skills".
More than half of lawyers called to the bar in Ontario are women. As a result, the law firms see the project as a practical way to structure their environments to attract and retain the best law students and lawyers.
More than 50 medium and large law firms have pledged to support The Justicia Project (including my firm Fogler, Rubinoff LLP). Each firm has committed to participate in the project for 3 years, from 2009 to 2011. All participants have signed written commitments to achieve goals in the following core areas:
- maternity and parental leave policies and flexible work arrangements;
- networking and business development;
- mentoring and leadership skills development for women; and
- monitoring progress.
More information is available about The Justicia Project and other initiatives to retain and advance women in private practice on the Law Society's website.
Regards,
Blair
More than half of lawyers called to the bar in Ontario are women. As a result, the law firms see the project as a practical way to structure their environments to attract and retain the best law students and lawyers.
More than 50 medium and large law firms have pledged to support The Justicia Project (including my firm Fogler, Rubinoff LLP). Each firm has committed to participate in the project for 3 years, from 2009 to 2011. All participants have signed written commitments to achieve goals in the following core areas:
- maternity and parental leave policies and flexible work arrangements;
- networking and business development;
- mentoring and leadership skills development for women; and
- monitoring progress.
More information is available about The Justicia Project and other initiatives to retain and advance women in private practice on the Law Society's website.
Regards,
Blair
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