During a ceremony in Vancouver, the city police department received information that an unknown individual intended to throw a pie at the Prime Minister who was in attendance. Based on his appearance, police officers mistakenly identified W as the would-be pie-thrower, chased him down and handcuffed him. W, who loudly protested his detention and created a disturbance, was arrested for breach of the peace and taken to the police lockup. Upon his arrival, the corrections officers conducted a strip search.
While W was at the lockup, police officers impounded his car for the purpose of searching it once a search warrant had been obtained. The detectives subsequently determined that they did not have grounds to obtain the required search warrant or evidence to charge W for attempted assault. W was released approximately 4.5 hours after his arrest. He brought an action in tort and for breach of his rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms against several parties, including the Province and the City.
With respect to the strip search and the car seizure, the trial judge held that, although the Province and the City did not act in bad faith and were not liable in tort for either incident, the Province's strip search and the City's vehicle seizure violated W's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter. The trial judge assessed damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter at $100 for the seizure of the car and $5,000 for the strip search. The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, upheld the trial judge's ruling.
The Suprem Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part.
The Chief Justice wrote as follows, "This appeal raises the question of when damages may be awarded under s. 24(1) of the Charter, and what the amount of such damages should be. Although the Charter is 28 years old, authority on this question is sparse, inviting a comprehensive analysis of the object of damages for Charter breaches and the considerations that guide their award.
The general considerations governing what constitutes an appropriate and just remedy under s. 24(1) were set out by Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62,  3 S.C.R. 3. Briefly, an appropriate and just remedy will: (1) meaningfully vindicate the rights and freedoms of the claimants; (2) employ means that are legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy; (3) be a judicial remedy which vindicates the right while invoking the function and powers of a court; and (4) be fair to the party against whom the order is made.
Damages for breach of a claimant's Charter rights may meet these conditions. They may meaningfully vindicate the claimant's rights and freedoms. They employ a means well-recognized within our legal framework. They are appropriate to the function and powers of a court. And, depending on the circumstances and the amount awarded, they can be fair not only to the claimant whose rights were breached, but to the state which is required to pay them. I therefore conclude that s. 24(1) is broad enough to include the remedy of damages for Charter breach. That said, granting damages under the Charter is a new endeavour, and an approach to when damages are appropriate and just should develop incrementally. Charter damages are only one remedy amongst others available under s. 24(1), and often other s. 24(1) remedies will be more responsive to the breach.
The term "damages" conveniently describes the remedy sought in this case. However, it should always be borne in mind that these are not private law damages, but the distinct remedy of constitutional damages. An action for public law damages "is not a private law action in the nature of a tort claim for which the state is vicariously liable, but [a distinct] public law action directly against the state for which the state is primarily liable". In accordance with s. 32 of the Charter, this is equally so in the Canadian constitutional context. The nature of the remedy is to require the state (or society writ large) to compensate an individual for breaches of the individual's constitutional rights. An action for public law damages - including constitutional damages - lies against the state and not against individual actors. Actions against individual actors should be pursued in accordance with existing causes of action. However, the underlying policy considerations that are engaged when awarding private law damages against state actors may be relevant when awarding public law damages directly against the state. Such considerations may be appropriately kept in mind.
The watchword of s. 24(1) is that the remedy must be "appropriate and just". This applies to the amount, or quantum, of damages awarded as much as to the initial question of whether damages are a proper remedy. Damages may be awarded to compensate the claimant for his loss, to vindicate the right or to deter future violations of the right. These objects, the presence and force of which vary from case to case, determine not only whether damages are appropriate, but also the amount of damages awarded. Generally, compensation will be the most important object, and vindication and deterrence will play supporting roles. This is all the more so because other Charter remedies may not provide compensation for the claimant's personal injury resulting from the violation of his Charter rights. However, as discussed earlier, cases may arise where vindication or deterrence play a major and even exclusive role.
Where the objective of compensation is engaged, the concern is to restore the claimant to the position she would have been in had the breach not been committed, as discussed above. As in a tort action, any claim for compensatory damages must be supported by evidence of the loss suffered. In some cases, the Charter breach may cause the claimant pecuniary loss. Injuries, physical and psychological, may require medical treatment, with attendant costs. Prolonged detention may result in loss of earnings. Restitutio in integrum requires compensation for such financial losses.
In other cases, like this one, the claimant's losses will be non-pecuniary. Non-pecuniary damages are harder to measure. Yet they are not by that reason to be rejected. Again, tort law provides assistance. Pain and suffering are compensable. Absent exceptional circumstances, compensation is fixed at a fairly modest conventional rate, subject to variation for the degree of suffering in the particular case. In extreme cases of catastrophic injury, a higher but still conventionally determined award is given on the basis that it serves the function purpose of providing substitute comforts and pleasures.
When we move from compensation to the objectives of vindication and deterrence, tort law is less useful. Making the appropriate determinations is an exercise in rationality and proportionality and will ultimately be guided by precedent as this important chapter of Charter jurisprudence is written by Canada's courts. That said, some initial observations may be made.
A principal guide to the determination of quantum is the seriousness of the breach, having regard to the objects of s. 24(1) damages. The seriousness of the breach must be evaluated with regard to the impact of the breach on the claimant and the seriousness of the state misconduct. Generally speaking, the more egregious the conduct and the more serious the repercussions on the claimant, the higher the award for vindication or deterrence will be.
Just as private law damages must be fair to both the plaintiff and the defendant, so s. 24(1) damages must be fair - or "appropriate and just" - to both the claimant and the state. The court must arrive at a quantum that respects this. Large awards and the consequent diversion of public funds may serve little functional purpose in terms of the claimant's needs and may be inappropriate or unjust from the public perspective. In considering what is fair to the claimant and the state, the court may take into account the public interest in good governance, the danger of deterring governments from undertaking beneficial new policies and programs, and the need to avoid diverting large sums of funds from public programs to private interests.
In assessing s. 24(1) damages, the court must focus on the breach of Charter rights as an independent wrong, worthy of compensation in its own right. At the same time, damages under s. 24(1) should not duplicate damages awarded under private law causes of action, such as tort, where compensation of personal loss is at issue. To sum up, the amount of damages must reflect what is required to functionally serve the objects of compensation serve, vindication of the right and deterrence of future breaches, insofar as they are engaged in a particular case, having regard to the impact of the breach on the claimant and the seriousness of the state conduct. The award must be appropriate and just from the perspective of the claimant and the state.
For a tribunal to grant a Charter remedy under s. 24(1), it must have the power to decide questions of law and the remedy must be one that the tribunal is authorized to grant: R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22. Generally, the appropriate forum for an award of damages under s. 24(1) is a court which has the power to consider Charter questions and which by statute or inherent jurisdiction has the power to award damages. Provincial criminal courts are not so empowered and thus do not have the power to award damages under s. 24(1).
As was done here, the claimant may join a s. 24(1) claim with a tort claim. It may be useful to consider the tort claim first, since if it meets the objects of Charter damages, recourse to s. 24(1) will be unnecessary. This may add useful context and facilitate the s. 24(1) analysis. This said, it is not essential that the claimant exhaust her remedies in private law before bringing a s. 24(1) claim.
(1) Damages for the Strip Search
The Charter breach significantly impacted on Mr. Ward's person and rights and the police conduct was serious. The impingement on Mr. Ward calls for compensation. Combined with the police conduct, it also engages the objects of vindication of the right and deterrence of future breaches. It follows that compensation is required in this case to functionally fulfill the objects of public law damages. Damages for the strip search of Mr. Ward are required in this case to functionally fulfill the objects of public law damages, and therefore are prima facie "appropriate and just". The state has not negated this. It follows that damages should be awarded for this breach of Mr. Ward's Charter rights. Considering all the factors, including the appropriate degree of deference to be paid to the trial judge's exercise of remedial discretion, I conclude that the trial judge's $5,000 damage award was appropriate.
(2) Damages for the Car Seizure
The trial judge found that the seizure of the car violated Mr. Ward's rights under s. 8 of the Charter. This finding is not contested and thus satisfies the first requirement. I conclude that a declaration under s. 24(1) that the vehicle seizure violated Mr. Ward's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter adequately serves the need for vindication of the right and deterrence of future improper car seizures."
See http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2010/2010scc27/2010scc27.html for the full text of the case.