In a recent decision of the Law Society Tribunal (“Tribunal”),- Law Society of Ontario v. Burtt, 2018 ONLSTH 63 - panelist Larry Banack dismissed an application by the Law Society of Ontario (“LSO”) seeking a finding that one of its lawyer licensees had committed professional misconduct. Mr. Banack found that the lawyer’s alleged misconduct, i.e. his failure to cooperate with a Law Society investigation was the direct result of a disability and that the Law Society had not discharged its legal obligation to accommodate the lawyer’s disability to the point of undue hardship.
Interestingly, despite evidence that many lawyers who are the subjects of LSO’s disciplinary proceedings are suffering from a mental illness such as depression which can amount to a disability under the Ontario Human Rights Code (the “Code”), Mr. Banack found that the circumstances of this case were “highly unusual”. His findings were largely based on the particular facts of the case, i.e. that the LSO knew that the lawyer was suffering from a disability that resulted in him “freezing” and therefore was unable to provide a written response to the LSO’s request for communication.
In this case, Mr. Burtt admitted that he had not responded in writing to the LSO. However, Mr. Burtt asserted that he was not capable of providing written responses, as demanded by the LSO, by reason of a documented disability that caused him to “freeze” when confronted with the investigation. The defence that was asserted by Mr. Burtt resulted from a previous discipline proceeding in 2015. As a result of that proceeding, the LSO with the consent of Mr. Burtt, commissioned and received two psychological reports. Those reports were contained in the LSO’s file and both reports concluded that Mr. Burtt was suffering from a psychological condition which negatively affected his ability to respond to the LSO within specified time frames.
In the previous matter, Mr. Burtt had been reprimanded and ordered to comply with a psychiatric treatment plan which remained in effect up until the date of the hearing before Mr. Banack. In making his finding against the LSO, Mr. Banack relied on testimony from an LSO investigator that not only had he not read the two psychological reports that were contained in the LSO’s file but had only learned of them on the morning of the hearing.
The Code prohibits discrimination with respect to membership in a trade or occupational association on specified grounds, one of which is disability. In a previous case – Law Society of Upper Canada v. Czernik (2010 ONLSHP 122) – the Tribunal held that: “The Law Society and the Tribunal are subject to the Code and must apply the duty to accommodate where there is a proven disability at play. A failure to fulfill professional obligations that is caused by a disability must be accommodated by the Law Society and the Panel”. The LSO was required to accommodate Mr. Burt to the point of undue hardship. Mr. Banack found that he was satisfied that the record before him was sufficient to make the findings as to the scope and content of the LSO’s duty to accommodate. Not only did Mr. Burtt tell the LSO about the prior disciplinary proceedings and the psychological reports, the decisions were publicly available on CanLII and it was part of his LSO file.
In addition, the information available to the LSO’s investigators from their own observations of Mr. Burtt, his conduct and his communications with them ought to have been enough to alert them to consider the existence of a condition which required accommodation. Mr. Banack found that the difference in this case, as compared to many before the Tribunal, was that Mr. Burtt had responded to the LSO on a timely basis and as Mr. Banack found, was to be contrasted with the ‘typical” response of the licensees in similar circumstances which included evasion, denial, obfuscation and disregard of professional obligations. In this unusual case, the investigators engaged with an apparently cooperative licensee in lengthy conversations in which he disclosed a prior proceeding and medical reports, offered promises of cooperation and did not seek to avoid or fail to communicate with them. He simply failed to follow through on his commitments.
All of this should have alerted the LSO’s investigators that the situation called for alternative thinking which by any other name amounted to accommodation. The issue then became one of whether the accommodation afforded by the LSO, i.e. providing additional time for Mr. Burtt to respond to it was sufficient in the circumstances. Mr. Banack found that it was not. He found that in the “highly unusual” circumstances of this licensee who was known to be suffering from a disability that resulted in freezing but engaged in protracted dialogue with the investigators, the burden was on the investigators to at least canvass what alternative approach might have fulfilled their objectives. In other words, that was no engagement in the express thought process of inquiry concerning the need for or scope of accommodation that was required.
In this case, it was impossible for Mr. Burtt to comply with the LSO’s requirement of written cooperation. The LSO had alleged that Mr. Burtt “failed to cooperate with the Law Society investigation by failing to provide a prompt and complete response to written requests made by the Law Society’s investigators”. Mr. Banack reviewed rule 7.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and held that a requirement to respond in writing is not found in either the rules or the notice of application. In other words, the LSO could have accommodated Mr. Burtt’s disability by allowing him to respond orally to their inquiries and to attend at his office to obtain the information that it needed. He concluded that the LSO had failed to satisfy its onus of demonstrating what considerations, assessments and steps were undertaken to accommodate Mr. Burtt “to the point of undue hardship”.
In dismissing the LSO’s application, Mr. Banack concluded that Mr. Burtt’s disability was the cause of his inability and failure to provide a written response to the investigator’s demands. Mr. Burtt did not fail to comply with his regulatory obligations but only failed, by reason of his disability, to comply with the manner to which compliance was demanded.