Today the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the federal government had failed to act diligently in fulfilling its obligation to the Métis settlers of the Red River territory.
A legal challenge by the Manitoba Métis Federation sought recognition for the treatment of its people after the 1870 government land deal that ended in the famous Red River Rebellion lead by Louis Riel.
The decision of the court allowed an appeal from the Manitoba Court of Appeal.
After Confederation, the first government of Canada embarked on a policy aimed at bringing the western territories into Canada. However, the French-speaking, Roman Catholic Métis, who were the dominant demographic group in the Red River Settlement resisted Canada's annexation. After some negotiation with Canada, the Red River settlers agreed to become part of Canada and Canada agreed to grant 1.4 million acres of land to the Métis children and to recognize existing land holdings. These obligations were subsequently set out in the provisions of the Manitoba Act (the "Act").
However, in the following years, the Canadian government made several mistakes, including determining who had a right to share in the land, distributing the land randomly, and underestimating the number of eligible Métis children.
The Métis sought a declaration that:
1. the Canadian government breached its fiduciary obligations owed to the Métis in implementing the Act;
2. the Canadian government failed to implement the Act in a manner consistent with the honour of the Crown; and
3. certain legislation passed by Manitoba effecting the implementation of the Act was ultra vires.
A trial judge and the Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the claim of the Métis.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part in finding that the government had failed to implement the land grant provisions established in 1870 in accordance with "the honour of the Crown".
The majority of the court (6 judges) held that the statutory obligations under the Act did not impose a fiduciary duty on the Canadian government. Although the Crown undertook discretionary control of the administration of the land grants, the Métis are Aboriginal and they had an interest in the land. The Act simply confirmed the continuance of different categories of land holdings in existence shortly before or at the creation of the new province of Manitoba. It did not constitute an undertaking on the part of the Crown to act as a fiduciary in settling the titles of the Métis land holders.
However, the majority found that the Métis were entitled to a declaration that the government of Canada had failed to act with diligence in implementing the land grant provision of the Act in accordance with the honour of the Crown.
The Court held that the ultimate purpose of the honour of the Crown is the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal societies with the assertion of Canadian sovereignty. Where this is at stake, it requires the Crown to act honourable in its dealings with the Aboriginal peoples in question. This requirement flows from the guarantee of Aboriginal rights in the Canadian Constitution Act. The Constitution is not a mere statute; it is the very document by which the Crown asserted its sovereignty in the face of prior Aboriginal occupation. An explicit obligation to an Aboriginal group in the Constitution engages the honour of the Crown.
In the context of the implementation of a constitutional obligation to an Aboriginal people, the honour of the Crown requires that the Crown:
1. take a broad purposive approach to the interpretation of the promise; and
2. acted diligently to fulfill it.
In this case, a persistent pattern of errors and indifference substantially frustrated the purpose of a solemn promise and amount to betrayal of the Crown's duty to act honourable in fulfilling its promise.
Regards,
Blair
Showing posts with label aboriginal treaty rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label aboriginal treaty rights. Show all posts
Friday, March 8, 2013
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Aboriginal Treaty Rights and the Environment
From the Eugene Meehan Supreme Court of Canada Lawletter:
The Cree and Inuit communities signed the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement with the governments of Quebec and Canada in 1975. The Agreement established a governance scheme and created a framework that would govern many aspects of life in the territory, including the aboriginal economic and social development and the preservation of the natural environment. Under s. 22, the Agreement set out detailed and comprehensive procedures for environmental impact assessments. Whether a provincial or federal assessment will be conducted under the Agreement depends on the constitutional jurisdiction within which the project itself falls. In particular, s. 22.6.7 provides that 'a project shall not be submitted to more than one (1) impact assessment and review procedure unless such project falls within the jurisdictions of both Québec and Canada'. If the exception applies, two assessments will be required, but these assessments may be combined with the 'mutual agreement' of the parties. Section 2.5 of the Agreement also provides that the Agreement is paramount over all other laws of general application that are inconsistent with it.
A company intends to open and operate a mine in the James Bay area of Quebec in the Agreement 'Category III' lands, an area where the Agreement recognizes Quebec's right to regulate natural resource development subject to the environmental protection provisions of s. 22. In accordance with the Agreement's procedures, the proponent of the project submitted to the administrator responsible for 'matters respecting provincial jurisdiction' information concerning its proposed development. The provincial Administrator transmitted this information to the Evaluating Committee, which made a recommendation about the extent of impact assessment and review and whether or not a preliminary and/or a final impact statement should be done. Subsequently, the provincial Administrator alone decided the scope of the assessment and gave appropriate directions to the proponent. On receipt of the provincial Administrator's instructions, the proponent supplied information about the potential environmental and social impacts, which acknowledged a significant impact on fish habitat. This was transmitted by the provincial Administrator to the provincial Review Committee and was then to be transmitted to the Cree Regional Authority for their representations.
Meanwhile, federal officials who were not involved in the review process under the Agreement, concluded that the project's impact on fisheries - a matter within exclusive federal jurisdiction under s. 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867 - engaged s. 35(2) of the Fisheries Act and required a comprehensive study pursuant to the regulations made under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act ('CEAA'). The federal officials informed the Cree that the study would be conducted by a review panel under the CEAA and not through the federal assessment procedure provided for in s. 22 of the Agreement. While the provincial review process of the project was still pending, the Cree commenced an action for declaratory relief in the Quebec Superior Court, which declared that only the provincial environmental assessment was applicable to the project pursuant to the Agreement. The Court of Appeal set aside that decision. The court concluded that the CEAA, in conjunction with the federal Fisheries Act, validly triggered a federal environmental assessment under the CEAA but that there were practical and operational inconsistencies between the CEAA review procedure and the one set out in the Agreement. Since the Agreement was paramount, the court held that CEAA review procedure was inapplicable, but substituted the federal review procedure in the Agreement for the one in the CEAA. The court also concluded that the project is subject as well to the provincial review procedure under s. 22 of the Agreement.
The Supreme Court of Canada held (6:3) that the appeal is dismissed, but the order of the Court of Appeal varied to provide that if the mine project is approved pursuant to the Agreement, the proponent may not proceed with the work without an authorization under s. 35(2) of the Fisheries Act, and that the issuance of any such authorization is to comply with the CEAA in accordance with its procedures, as well as the Crown's duty to consult with the Cree in relation to matters that may adversely affect their rights under the Agreement.
Justice Binnie wrote as follows (at pages 4, 25, 27-28):
"...it is necessary to approach this case on the basis of the terms the parties actually negotiated and agreed to as set out in the text of their agreement rather than on general observations and ideas which, in my respectful view, are unsupported by the text.
...Common sense as well as legal requirements suggest that the CEAA assessment will be structured to accommodate the special context of a project proposal in the James Bay Treaty territory, including the participation of the Cree. Reference has already been made to the possibility of a joint or substituted panel under ss. 40 to 45 of the CEAA. Nevertheless, the legal question before us is whether, absent such an arrangement, the federal Minister is bound to issue a s. 35(2) fisheries permit following the approval of a mining project by the Administrator (or the Quebec Cabinet) and, in my view, he is not so bound.
...In my view, the vanadium mine cannot lawfully proceed without a fisheries permit. The proponent is unable to obtain, and the federal Minister is unable to issue, a s. 35(2) fisheries permit without compliance with the CEAA. The contention of the Quebec Attorney General that the Treaty requires the federal Minister to issue the s. 35(2) fisheries permit as a result of the province-led review panel regardless of the federal Minister's independent assessment of potential damage to fish habitat should be rejected.
It is only after final approval by the Treaty bodies that it can be said that "the proposed development is approved in accordance with the provisions of this Section", which is the condition precedent to the proponent's obligations under s. 22.7.1 to "obtai[n] where applicable the necessary authorization or permits from responsible Government Departments and Services". There is thus no conflict. The need for a post-Treaty approval fisheries permit is made mandatory by the Treaty itself ("shall" obtain). In the case of fisheries, it is federal law, not the Treaty, that governs when such a permit may be granted as well as its terms and conditions.
I agree with the observation expressed by my colleagues LeBel and Deschamps JJ. that "[i]t would hardly be reasonable to believe that the parties intended that one of them might sign the Agreement one day and withdraw its signature the next day, week or year in respect of a key part of their contract" (para. 58). This sentiment is true so far as it goes, but in my view, with respect, it has no application to the dispute at issue in this appeal. I would dismiss the appeal but vary the order of the Quebec Court of Appeal to provide that if the vanadium mine project is approved pursuant to the Treaty, the proponent may not proceed with the work without authorization under s. 35(2) of the Fisheries Act, and that the issuance of any such authorization is to comply with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act in accordance with its procedures, as well as the Crown's duty to consult with the First Nations in relation to matters that may adversely affect their Treaty rights."
Regards,
Blair
The Cree and Inuit communities signed the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement with the governments of Quebec and Canada in 1975. The Agreement established a governance scheme and created a framework that would govern many aspects of life in the territory, including the aboriginal economic and social development and the preservation of the natural environment. Under s. 22, the Agreement set out detailed and comprehensive procedures for environmental impact assessments. Whether a provincial or federal assessment will be conducted under the Agreement depends on the constitutional jurisdiction within which the project itself falls. In particular, s. 22.6.7 provides that 'a project shall not be submitted to more than one (1) impact assessment and review procedure unless such project falls within the jurisdictions of both Québec and Canada'. If the exception applies, two assessments will be required, but these assessments may be combined with the 'mutual agreement' of the parties. Section 2.5 of the Agreement also provides that the Agreement is paramount over all other laws of general application that are inconsistent with it.
A company intends to open and operate a mine in the James Bay area of Quebec in the Agreement 'Category III' lands, an area where the Agreement recognizes Quebec's right to regulate natural resource development subject to the environmental protection provisions of s. 22. In accordance with the Agreement's procedures, the proponent of the project submitted to the administrator responsible for 'matters respecting provincial jurisdiction' information concerning its proposed development. The provincial Administrator transmitted this information to the Evaluating Committee, which made a recommendation about the extent of impact assessment and review and whether or not a preliminary and/or a final impact statement should be done. Subsequently, the provincial Administrator alone decided the scope of the assessment and gave appropriate directions to the proponent. On receipt of the provincial Administrator's instructions, the proponent supplied information about the potential environmental and social impacts, which acknowledged a significant impact on fish habitat. This was transmitted by the provincial Administrator to the provincial Review Committee and was then to be transmitted to the Cree Regional Authority for their representations.
Meanwhile, federal officials who were not involved in the review process under the Agreement, concluded that the project's impact on fisheries - a matter within exclusive federal jurisdiction under s. 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867 - engaged s. 35(2) of the Fisheries Act and required a comprehensive study pursuant to the regulations made under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act ('CEAA'). The federal officials informed the Cree that the study would be conducted by a review panel under the CEAA and not through the federal assessment procedure provided for in s. 22 of the Agreement. While the provincial review process of the project was still pending, the Cree commenced an action for declaratory relief in the Quebec Superior Court, which declared that only the provincial environmental assessment was applicable to the project pursuant to the Agreement. The Court of Appeal set aside that decision. The court concluded that the CEAA, in conjunction with the federal Fisheries Act, validly triggered a federal environmental assessment under the CEAA but that there were practical and operational inconsistencies between the CEAA review procedure and the one set out in the Agreement. Since the Agreement was paramount, the court held that CEAA review procedure was inapplicable, but substituted the federal review procedure in the Agreement for the one in the CEAA. The court also concluded that the project is subject as well to the provincial review procedure under s. 22 of the Agreement.
The Supreme Court of Canada held (6:3) that the appeal is dismissed, but the order of the Court of Appeal varied to provide that if the mine project is approved pursuant to the Agreement, the proponent may not proceed with the work without an authorization under s. 35(2) of the Fisheries Act, and that the issuance of any such authorization is to comply with the CEAA in accordance with its procedures, as well as the Crown's duty to consult with the Cree in relation to matters that may adversely affect their rights under the Agreement.
Justice Binnie wrote as follows (at pages 4, 25, 27-28):
"...it is necessary to approach this case on the basis of the terms the parties actually negotiated and agreed to as set out in the text of their agreement rather than on general observations and ideas which, in my respectful view, are unsupported by the text.
...Common sense as well as legal requirements suggest that the CEAA assessment will be structured to accommodate the special context of a project proposal in the James Bay Treaty territory, including the participation of the Cree. Reference has already been made to the possibility of a joint or substituted panel under ss. 40 to 45 of the CEAA. Nevertheless, the legal question before us is whether, absent such an arrangement, the federal Minister is bound to issue a s. 35(2) fisheries permit following the approval of a mining project by the Administrator (or the Quebec Cabinet) and, in my view, he is not so bound.
...In my view, the vanadium mine cannot lawfully proceed without a fisheries permit. The proponent is unable to obtain, and the federal Minister is unable to issue, a s. 35(2) fisheries permit without compliance with the CEAA. The contention of the Quebec Attorney General that the Treaty requires the federal Minister to issue the s. 35(2) fisheries permit as a result of the province-led review panel regardless of the federal Minister's independent assessment of potential damage to fish habitat should be rejected.
It is only after final approval by the Treaty bodies that it can be said that "the proposed development is approved in accordance with the provisions of this Section", which is the condition precedent to the proponent's obligations under s. 22.7.1 to "obtai[n] where applicable the necessary authorization or permits from responsible Government Departments and Services". There is thus no conflict. The need for a post-Treaty approval fisheries permit is made mandatory by the Treaty itself ("shall" obtain). In the case of fisheries, it is federal law, not the Treaty, that governs when such a permit may be granted as well as its terms and conditions.
I agree with the observation expressed by my colleagues LeBel and Deschamps JJ. that "[i]t would hardly be reasonable to believe that the parties intended that one of them might sign the Agreement one day and withdraw its signature the next day, week or year in respect of a key part of their contract" (para. 58). This sentiment is true so far as it goes, but in my view, with respect, it has no application to the dispute at issue in this appeal. I would dismiss the appeal but vary the order of the Quebec Court of Appeal to provide that if the vanadium mine project is approved pursuant to the Treaty, the proponent may not proceed with the work without authorization under s. 35(2) of the Fisheries Act, and that the issuance of any such authorization is to comply with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act in accordance with its procedures, as well as the Crown's duty to consult with the First Nations in relation to matters that may adversely affect their Treaty rights."
Regards,
Blair
Friday, February 5, 2010
NAN Grand Chief: What Treaties Mean
From a Letter by Nishnawbe Aski Nation Grand Chief Stan Beardy to the Thunder Bay, Ontario Chronicle Journal.
What treaties mean
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
I am writing in response to the anonymous letter titled Gov‘t Using Companies As Pawns To Avoid Forcing Treaty Compliance published on Jan. 23. I would like to thank that individual for making the public aware that this is a treaty issue. For First Nations, a treaty is an agreement between two sovereigns. This is recognized as common knowledge at the international level. Knowing so, the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that the Crown has a legal duty to consult. I wholeheartedly agree with the statement that the government is not complying with the treaty and that it is crucial for government to settle outstanding differences. It is truly unfortunate that the exploration and mining industry have to bear the brunt of our treaty partner‘s inability to do so. Until these outstanding differences are resolved between the First Nations and the Crown, blockades such as what is taking place in the Ring of Fire will become a common occurrence. It is plain and simple to First Nations; they are defending their constitutionally protected treaty, aboriginal and inherent rights which they believe come before any rights and interests the exploration and mining industry may have. Carts must not be put before the horse.
With respect to the misperceived notion that First Nations are contravening the treaty, I take great exception to the writer‘s interpretation of the words contained in Treaty 9. As many may not know, the manner in which the treaty making process took place in Canada was unjust. As such, First Nations take the position that in order to achieve true reconciliation, we also have to look at the context in which the treaty was signed and go beyond the words that were put before a nation of people whose mother tongue was inherently different. The discussion and resolution on the spirit and intent of the treaty has been long awaited by First Nations. For many years we have voiced the need to resolve this matter, but we have only been met by deaf and uncompromising ears. If the exploration and mining industry is ever to achieve the stability that they so naively expect to be in place without first resolving the treaty issue, then they should do their part in continuing to urge the Crown to be honourable treaty partners by living up to its spirit and intent. Recognizing that many may not truly understand what this means, NAN will be doing its part to educate.
Grand Chief Stan Beardy Nishnawbe Aski Nation
Regards,
Blair
What treaties mean
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
I am writing in response to the anonymous letter titled Gov‘t Using Companies As Pawns To Avoid Forcing Treaty Compliance published on Jan. 23. I would like to thank that individual for making the public aware that this is a treaty issue. For First Nations, a treaty is an agreement between two sovereigns. This is recognized as common knowledge at the international level. Knowing so, the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that the Crown has a legal duty to consult. I wholeheartedly agree with the statement that the government is not complying with the treaty and that it is crucial for government to settle outstanding differences. It is truly unfortunate that the exploration and mining industry have to bear the brunt of our treaty partner‘s inability to do so. Until these outstanding differences are resolved between the First Nations and the Crown, blockades such as what is taking place in the Ring of Fire will become a common occurrence. It is plain and simple to First Nations; they are defending their constitutionally protected treaty, aboriginal and inherent rights which they believe come before any rights and interests the exploration and mining industry may have. Carts must not be put before the horse.
With respect to the misperceived notion that First Nations are contravening the treaty, I take great exception to the writer‘s interpretation of the words contained in Treaty 9. As many may not know, the manner in which the treaty making process took place in Canada was unjust. As such, First Nations take the position that in order to achieve true reconciliation, we also have to look at the context in which the treaty was signed and go beyond the words that were put before a nation of people whose mother tongue was inherently different. The discussion and resolution on the spirit and intent of the treaty has been long awaited by First Nations. For many years we have voiced the need to resolve this matter, but we have only been met by deaf and uncompromising ears. If the exploration and mining industry is ever to achieve the stability that they so naively expect to be in place without first resolving the treaty issue, then they should do their part in continuing to urge the Crown to be honourable treaty partners by living up to its spirit and intent. Recognizing that many may not truly understand what this means, NAN will be doing its part to educate.
Grand Chief Stan Beardy Nishnawbe Aski Nation
Regards,
Blair
Monday, July 6, 2009
Hunting at night an offence despite aboriginal Treaty rights
In R. v. Jacob, aboriginal defendants were hunting moose from a van on a gravel road at night. They were charged with hunting at night contrary to a provision of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1997 ("Act") and one of them was also charged with discharging a firearm across a road contrary to another provision of the Act. The Justice of the Peace before whom the trial was heard rejected the defendants argument that they had a defence to the charges because they were exercising their right to hunt under Treaty 9 at the relevant time. They were convicted and their conviction was affirmed by the summary conviction appeal judge. They appealed their convictions further to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal and upheld the convictions on the following grounds:
The Court held that section 17(1)(e) of the Act makes it an offence to "discharge a firearm in or across the travelled portion of a right of way for public vehicular traffic". In order to establish that the land in question is a "right of way for public vehicular traffic" the Crown is not required to provide that the provincial government or someone else with legal authority has granted the public the right to use the land by way of dedication or other legal process. One of the purposes of section 17(1)(e) is to prevent members of the public who are travelling in vehicles from the dangers arising from the discharge of firearms. That purpose can best be achieved by interpreting the phrase "a right of way for public vehicular traffic" broadly so as to protect member of the public driving on all lands that are open to public use in vehicles. There is evidence in this case that the road was a roadway used by the public. Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant was properly convicted of the offence under section 17(1)(e) of the Act.
The Court further held that the aboriginal right to fish and hunt in Treaty 9 is subject to an exception for "such tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes". The test for determining whether lands are "taken up" is whether the use being made of the land is visibly incompatible with the exercise of the treaty right. Whether or not land has been taken up is a question of fact and must be resolved in a case-by-case basis. Hunting on the road in question in this case was visibly incompatible with the use to which the road had been put for many years. The Court held that it was a well-established primary haul road used by both lumber company employees and the public. Roadways used by the public are incompatible with hunting. The defendants knew about the uses to which the road was put. As a result, the Court found that they were properly convicted of hunting at night.
Regards,
Blair
The Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal and upheld the convictions on the following grounds:
The Court held that section 17(1)(e) of the Act makes it an offence to "discharge a firearm in or across the travelled portion of a right of way for public vehicular traffic". In order to establish that the land in question is a "right of way for public vehicular traffic" the Crown is not required to provide that the provincial government or someone else with legal authority has granted the public the right to use the land by way of dedication or other legal process. One of the purposes of section 17(1)(e) is to prevent members of the public who are travelling in vehicles from the dangers arising from the discharge of firearms. That purpose can best be achieved by interpreting the phrase "a right of way for public vehicular traffic" broadly so as to protect member of the public driving on all lands that are open to public use in vehicles. There is evidence in this case that the road was a roadway used by the public. Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant was properly convicted of the offence under section 17(1)(e) of the Act.
The Court further held that the aboriginal right to fish and hunt in Treaty 9 is subject to an exception for "such tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes". The test for determining whether lands are "taken up" is whether the use being made of the land is visibly incompatible with the exercise of the treaty right. Whether or not land has been taken up is a question of fact and must be resolved in a case-by-case basis. Hunting on the road in question in this case was visibly incompatible with the use to which the road had been put for many years. The Court held that it was a well-established primary haul road used by both lumber company employees and the public. Roadways used by the public are incompatible with hunting. The defendants knew about the uses to which the road was put. As a result, the Court found that they were properly convicted of hunting at night.
Regards,
Blair
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