In a recent decision, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice awarded a corporate executive general damages of $100,000, aggravated damages of $50,000, punitive damages of $50,000 and approximately $50,000 in legal fees against an anonymous "John Doe" defendant who had persisted in posting defamatory comments about executive on a website hosted by Blogger, a Google web service.
The plaintiff was a lawyer and a director of legal affairs at Quebecor Media Inc. ("Quebecor"). The defendant was unknown.
In 2010, the plaintiff became aware that defamatory statements about him were being posted on the website hosted by Blogger. The Blogger posts stated that the plaintiff was "a lying crook, a Nazi, a pedophile and rapist, a thief and a morally repugnant imbecile". The court found that, "The plaintiff is obviously none of those things".
In May of 2010, the defendant sent emails to senior Quebecor executives with links to the Blogger posts.
In June of 2010, the plaintiff's lawyers commenced the action against "John Doe No. 1". The defendant subsequently posted further defamatory posts.
The plaintiff brought a motion to compel Google to disclose information that would identify the defendant. Although the defendant responded from the same email account that he had used to communicate with Quebecor's management, his identity was never discovered.
In July and August of 2010, Google removed the Blogger posts. However, the defendant commenced posting defamatory statements about the plaintiff on another website. In the meantime, the plaintiff continued to attempt to identify the defendant. He obtained an order extending the time for service of the statement of claim. Plaintiff's counsel sent emails to the defendant at the email account that he had been known to use. The defendant responded by email that "We are not formally served with notice of any impending proceeding with respect to this matter. As far as we are concerned, we have no duty or obligation to meaningful [sic] respond to or appear at any proceeding."
The plaintiff then obtained an order validating service of the statement of claim and ordering that the subsequent defamatory posts be removed. The motions judge also ordered that the defendant identify himself, however he refused to do so. The plaintiff subsequently noted the plaintiff in default.
On February 16, 2012, the registrar of the court administratively dismissed the action. At the end of February 2012, plaintiff's counsel received a copy of the registrar's dismissal order. There had been no previous notice from the registrar. On a motion brought by the plaintiff, the court set aside the administrative dismissal and granted judgment for defamation.
Justice Goldstein of the court held that "there are few things more cowardly and insidious than an anonymous blogger who posts spiteful and defamatory comments about reputable members of the public and then hides behind the electronic curtain provided by the internet". The court found that the posts were defamatory and because the defendant had already been noted in default, granted judgment accordingly.
The court awarded general damages based on the principle that such damages are presumed in a defamation case on the basis that harm automatically and logically follows from the very publication of the false statements. At the motion the plaintiff sought and the court granted general damages in the amount of $100,000. The court awarded aggravated damages on the basis that the defendant was guilty of high-handed, spiteful and vicious conduct. The court found that the circumstances of this case were particularly egregious. The defendant had never apologized, retracted or in any way sought to justify his statements. Even in the face of a statement of claim, the defendant continued to make defamatory posts. The court awarded $50,000.
The court held that this case was an obvious one for punitive damages. There is no question that the defendant acted maliciously and oppressively. The defendant's actions offended the court's sense of decency and because the court reflected community standards, it sent a strong message of denunciation and deterrence. The court awarded $50,000.
Finally, the court held that because costs are within the discretion of the court, it awarded substantial indemnity costs because the defendant persisted on driving up the plaintiff's legal costs even in the face of a continuing refusal to comply with a court order.
Regards,
Blair
Showing posts with label news media. Show all posts
Showing posts with label news media. Show all posts
Friday, June 21, 2013
Tuesday, October 2, 2012
Supreme Court of Canada on harmful effects of Cyberbullying
Here is a synopsis of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on cyberbullying:
A 15‑year old girl found out that someone had posted a fake Facebook profile using her picture, a slightly modified version of her name, and other particulars identifying her. The picture was accompanied by unflattering commentary about the girl’s appearance along with sexually explicit references. Through her father as guardian, the girl brought an application for an order requiring the Internet provider to disclose the identity of the person(s) who used the IP address to publish the profile so that she could identify potential defendants for an action in defamation. As part of her application, she asked for permission to anonymously seek the identity of the creator of the profile and for a publication ban on the content of the profile. Two media groups opposed the request for anonymity and the ban. The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia granted the request that the Internet provider disclose the information about the publisher of the profile, but denied the request for anonymity and the publication ban because there was insufficient evidence of specific harm to the girl. The judge stayed that part of his order requiring the Internet provider to disclose the publisher’s identity until either a successful appeal allowed the girl to proceed anonymously or until she filed a draft order which used her own and her father’s real names. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision primarily on the ground that the girl had not discharged the onus of showing that there was evidence of harm to her which justified restricting access to the media.
Held: The appeal should be allowed in part.
The critical importance of the open court principle and a free press has been tenaciously embedded in the jurisprudence. In this case, however, there are interests that are sufficiently compelling to justify restricting such access: privacy and the protection of children from cyberbullying.
Recognition of the inherent vulnerability of children has consistent and deep roots in Canadian law and results in the protection of young people’s privacy rights based on age, not the sensitivity of the particular child. In an application involving cyberbullying, there is no need for a child to demonstrate that he or she personally conforms to this legal paradigm. The law attributes the heightened vulnerability based on chronology, not temperament.
While evidence of a direct, harmful consequence to an individual applicant is relevant, courts may also conclude that there is objectively discernable harm. It is logical to infer that children can suffer harm through cyberbullying, given the psychological toxicity of the phenomenon. Since children are entitled to protect themselves from bullying, cyber or otherwise, there is inevitable harm to them — and to the administration of justice — if they decline to take steps to protect themselves because of the risk of further harm from public disclosure. Since common sense and the evidence show that young victims of sexualized bullying are particularly vulnerable to the harms of revictimization upon publication, and since the right to protection will disappear for most children without the further protection of anonymity, the girl’s anonymous legal pursuit of the identity of her cyberbully should be allowed.
In Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122, prohibiting identity disclosure was found to represent only minimal harm to press freedom. The serious harm in failing to protect young victims of bullying through anonymity, as a result, outweighs this minimal harm. But once the girl’s identity is protected through her right to proceed anonymously, there is little justification for a publication ban on the non‑identifying content of the profile. If the non‑identifying information is made public, there is no harmful impact on the girl since the information cannot be connected to her. The public’s right to open courts –and press freedom – therefore prevail with respect to the non‑identifying Facebook content.
Regards,
Blair
A 15‑year old girl found out that someone had posted a fake Facebook profile using her picture, a slightly modified version of her name, and other particulars identifying her. The picture was accompanied by unflattering commentary about the girl’s appearance along with sexually explicit references. Through her father as guardian, the girl brought an application for an order requiring the Internet provider to disclose the identity of the person(s) who used the IP address to publish the profile so that she could identify potential defendants for an action in defamation. As part of her application, she asked for permission to anonymously seek the identity of the creator of the profile and for a publication ban on the content of the profile. Two media groups opposed the request for anonymity and the ban. The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia granted the request that the Internet provider disclose the information about the publisher of the profile, but denied the request for anonymity and the publication ban because there was insufficient evidence of specific harm to the girl. The judge stayed that part of his order requiring the Internet provider to disclose the publisher’s identity until either a successful appeal allowed the girl to proceed anonymously or until she filed a draft order which used her own and her father’s real names. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision primarily on the ground that the girl had not discharged the onus of showing that there was evidence of harm to her which justified restricting access to the media.
Held: The appeal should be allowed in part.
The critical importance of the open court principle and a free press has been tenaciously embedded in the jurisprudence. In this case, however, there are interests that are sufficiently compelling to justify restricting such access: privacy and the protection of children from cyberbullying.
Recognition of the inherent vulnerability of children has consistent and deep roots in Canadian law and results in the protection of young people’s privacy rights based on age, not the sensitivity of the particular child. In an application involving cyberbullying, there is no need for a child to demonstrate that he or she personally conforms to this legal paradigm. The law attributes the heightened vulnerability based on chronology, not temperament.
While evidence of a direct, harmful consequence to an individual applicant is relevant, courts may also conclude that there is objectively discernable harm. It is logical to infer that children can suffer harm through cyberbullying, given the psychological toxicity of the phenomenon. Since children are entitled to protect themselves from bullying, cyber or otherwise, there is inevitable harm to them — and to the administration of justice — if they decline to take steps to protect themselves because of the risk of further harm from public disclosure. Since common sense and the evidence show that young victims of sexualized bullying are particularly vulnerable to the harms of revictimization upon publication, and since the right to protection will disappear for most children without the further protection of anonymity, the girl’s anonymous legal pursuit of the identity of her cyberbully should be allowed.
In Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122, prohibiting identity disclosure was found to represent only minimal harm to press freedom. The serious harm in failing to protect young victims of bullying through anonymity, as a result, outweighs this minimal harm. But once the girl’s identity is protected through her right to proceed anonymously, there is little justification for a publication ban on the non‑identifying content of the profile. If the non‑identifying information is made public, there is no harmful impact on the girl since the information cannot be connected to her. The public’s right to open courts –and press freedom – therefore prevail with respect to the non‑identifying Facebook content.
Regards,
Blair
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
No Protection of Confidential Sources for Evidence of Crimes
From Eugene Meehan's Supreme Court of Canada Lawletter:
The National Post employed M as a journalist. M investigated whether C, then Prime Minister of Canada, was improperly involved with a loan from a federally funded bank to a hotel in C's riding which allegedly owed a debt to C's family investment company. X, a secret source, provided M with relevant information in exchange for a blanket, unconditional promise of confidentiality. In 2001, M received a sealed envelope in the mail that contained a document which appeared to be the bank's authorization of its loan to the hotel. If genuine, it could show that C had a conflict of interest in relation to the loan. M faxed copies of the document to the bank, to the Prime Minister's office, and to a lawyer for the Prime Minister. All three said that the document was a forgery. Shortly thereafter, X met M. X described receiving the document anonymously in the mail, discarding the original envelope, and passing the document on to M in the belief that it was genuine. M was satisfied that X was a reliable source who did not believe that the document was a forgery when he or she forwarded it to M. X feared that fingerprint or DNA analysis might reveal his or her identity and asked M to destroy the document and the envelope. M refused but told X that his undertaking of confidentiality would remain binding as long as he believed that X had not deliberately misled him.
The bank complained to the RCMP and an officer asked the appellants to produce the document and the envelope as physical evidence of the alleged crimes i.e. the forgery itself and the "uttering" (or putting into circulation) of the doctored bank records. They refused and M declined to identify his source.
The officer applied for a search warrant and an assistance order compelling M's editor to assist the police in locating the document and the envelope. He intended to submit them for forensic testing to determine if they carried fingerprints or other identifying markings (including DNA) which might assist in identifying the source of the document. Although the Crown informed the judge that the National Post had requested notification of the application, the hearing proceeded ex parte and a search warrant and an assistance order were issued.
The warrant and the order provided the appellants with one month before the RCMP could search the National Post's premises and included other terms intended to accommodate the needs of the National Post as a media entity. The appellants applied to quash the warrant and assistance order. The reviewing judge held that there was sufficient information to conclude the document was a forgery but that there was only a remote and speculative possibility that disclosure of the document and the envelope would advance a criminal investigation. She set aside the search warrant and the assistance order. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and reinstated the search warrant and the assistance order. In this Court, the appellants and supporting interveners argued that the warrant and the order should be quashed because they infringe s. 2(b) or s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or because the secret sources are protected by the common law of privilege."
The Supreme Court of Canada (with one judge writing partially concurring reasons, and another dissenting reasons) that the appeal is dismissed.
Justice Binnie wrote as follows (at pages 2-3):
"The public has the right to every person's evidence. That is the general rule. The question raised by this appeal is whether the appellants can exempt themselves from this obligation on the basis of a journalistic privilege rooted either in s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees freedom of expression, "including freedom of the press and other media of communication", or in the common law.
Specifically, the National Post, its editor-in-chief and one of its journalists apply to set aside a search warrant obtained from the Ontario Court of Justice authorizing the police to seize what are alleged to be forged bank records and the envelope in which the appellants received the records from secret source(s). The police believe that seizure of the physical documents is essential to proof of the forgery, and that forensic analysis may lead them directly or indirectly to the identity of the perpetrators. The appellants, for their part, seek to protect the identity of their secret source(s), who may or may not be directly implicated in the forgery. If the police are correct, therefore, the documents in the control of the National Post and its co-appellants are not merely links in the chain of criminal investigation but constitute in themselves the essential physical evidence of alleged crimes - the forgery itself and the "uttering" (or putting into circulation) of the doctored bank records in the plain brown envelope.
The courts should strive to uphold the special position of the media and protect the media's secret sources where such protection is in the public interest, but this is not the usual case of journalists seeking to avoid testifying about their secret sources. This is a physical evidence case. It involves what is reasonably believed to be a forged document. Forgery is a serious crime...I agree with the Ontario Court of Appeal (2008 ONCA 139, 89 O.R. (3d) 1) that the media claim to immunity from production of the physical evidence is not justified in the circumstances disclosed in the evidence before the court even if the end result proves to be information that may lead to the identification of the secret source(s)."
Regards,
Blair
The National Post employed M as a journalist. M investigated whether C, then Prime Minister of Canada, was improperly involved with a loan from a federally funded bank to a hotel in C's riding which allegedly owed a debt to C's family investment company. X, a secret source, provided M with relevant information in exchange for a blanket, unconditional promise of confidentiality. In 2001, M received a sealed envelope in the mail that contained a document which appeared to be the bank's authorization of its loan to the hotel. If genuine, it could show that C had a conflict of interest in relation to the loan. M faxed copies of the document to the bank, to the Prime Minister's office, and to a lawyer for the Prime Minister. All three said that the document was a forgery. Shortly thereafter, X met M. X described receiving the document anonymously in the mail, discarding the original envelope, and passing the document on to M in the belief that it was genuine. M was satisfied that X was a reliable source who did not believe that the document was a forgery when he or she forwarded it to M. X feared that fingerprint or DNA analysis might reveal his or her identity and asked M to destroy the document and the envelope. M refused but told X that his undertaking of confidentiality would remain binding as long as he believed that X had not deliberately misled him.
The bank complained to the RCMP and an officer asked the appellants to produce the document and the envelope as physical evidence of the alleged crimes i.e. the forgery itself and the "uttering" (or putting into circulation) of the doctored bank records. They refused and M declined to identify his source.
The officer applied for a search warrant and an assistance order compelling M's editor to assist the police in locating the document and the envelope. He intended to submit them for forensic testing to determine if they carried fingerprints or other identifying markings (including DNA) which might assist in identifying the source of the document. Although the Crown informed the judge that the National Post had requested notification of the application, the hearing proceeded ex parte and a search warrant and an assistance order were issued.
The warrant and the order provided the appellants with one month before the RCMP could search the National Post's premises and included other terms intended to accommodate the needs of the National Post as a media entity. The appellants applied to quash the warrant and assistance order. The reviewing judge held that there was sufficient information to conclude the document was a forgery but that there was only a remote and speculative possibility that disclosure of the document and the envelope would advance a criminal investigation. She set aside the search warrant and the assistance order. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and reinstated the search warrant and the assistance order. In this Court, the appellants and supporting interveners argued that the warrant and the order should be quashed because they infringe s. 2(b) or s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or because the secret sources are protected by the common law of privilege."
The Supreme Court of Canada (with one judge writing partially concurring reasons, and another dissenting reasons) that the appeal is dismissed.
Justice Binnie wrote as follows (at pages 2-3):
"The public has the right to every person's evidence. That is the general rule. The question raised by this appeal is whether the appellants can exempt themselves from this obligation on the basis of a journalistic privilege rooted either in s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees freedom of expression, "including freedom of the press and other media of communication", or in the common law.
Specifically, the National Post, its editor-in-chief and one of its journalists apply to set aside a search warrant obtained from the Ontario Court of Justice authorizing the police to seize what are alleged to be forged bank records and the envelope in which the appellants received the records from secret source(s). The police believe that seizure of the physical documents is essential to proof of the forgery, and that forensic analysis may lead them directly or indirectly to the identity of the perpetrators. The appellants, for their part, seek to protect the identity of their secret source(s), who may or may not be directly implicated in the forgery. If the police are correct, therefore, the documents in the control of the National Post and its co-appellants are not merely links in the chain of criminal investigation but constitute in themselves the essential physical evidence of alleged crimes - the forgery itself and the "uttering" (or putting into circulation) of the doctored bank records in the plain brown envelope.
The courts should strive to uphold the special position of the media and protect the media's secret sources where such protection is in the public interest, but this is not the usual case of journalists seeking to avoid testifying about their secret sources. This is a physical evidence case. It involves what is reasonably believed to be a forged document. Forgery is a serious crime...I agree with the Ontario Court of Appeal (2008 ONCA 139, 89 O.R. (3d) 1) that the media claim to immunity from production of the physical evidence is not justified in the circumstances disclosed in the evidence before the court even if the end result proves to be information that may lead to the identification of the secret source(s)."
Regards,
Blair
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Freelance Writers Settle for Big Bucks
CTVglobemedia Inc., Thompson Reuters Canada and The Gale Group have recently agreed to pay an $11 million settlement in a class-action lawsuit commenced in 1996 by freelance writer Heather Robinson. The case originated with Robinson, who disputed the fact that the Globe & Mail newspaper had included articles she submitted to the Globe's print edition into electronic databases without paying her what she felt was paid proper compensation for doing so.
Robinson, a founding member of the Professional Writers Association of Canada, submitted articles to the Globe for the newspapers print edition that were then included in three electronic data bases: InfoGlobe Online; an electronic version of the Canadian Periodical Index; as well as in a CD ROM that contained a years' worth of several Canadian newspapers. Robertson filed the class action lawsuit over the unauthorized reproduction of her work as well as that of thousands of other freelance writers.
In 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that newspapers and magazines do not have the right to transfer articles from their print editions into electronic databases without the consent of the writers, ruling that the databases resulted in "a different product that infringes" the creator's copyright. However, the Court did make an allowance for CD ROMs that present articles in the same overall look of the printed newspapers or magazines.
The Supreme Court of Canada held, in a 5 - 4 decision, that newspaper publishers are not entitled to republish freelance articles acquired for publication in their newspapers in electronic databases without compensating the authors and obtaining their consent. Newspaper publishers have a copyright in their newspapers pursuant to the Copyright Act to "reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever". The court held that a substantial part of a newspaper may consist only of the original selection so long as the "essence" of the newspaper is preserved. In online databases, the originality of the freelance articles is reproduced but the originality of the newspaper is not. The resulting collective work is of a different nature than the original newspaper.
By contrast, the Court held that CD ROMs, which were essentially a compendium of daily newspaper editions, remained faithful to the essence of the original work - (that line could be a direct quote from Colonel Jack Ripper in Dr. Strangelove).
Regards,
Blair
Robinson, a founding member of the Professional Writers Association of Canada, submitted articles to the Globe for the newspapers print edition that were then included in three electronic data bases: InfoGlobe Online; an electronic version of the Canadian Periodical Index; as well as in a CD ROM that contained a years' worth of several Canadian newspapers. Robertson filed the class action lawsuit over the unauthorized reproduction of her work as well as that of thousands of other freelance writers.
In 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that newspapers and magazines do not have the right to transfer articles from their print editions into electronic databases without the consent of the writers, ruling that the databases resulted in "a different product that infringes" the creator's copyright. However, the Court did make an allowance for CD ROMs that present articles in the same overall look of the printed newspapers or magazines.
The Supreme Court of Canada held, in a 5 - 4 decision, that newspaper publishers are not entitled to republish freelance articles acquired for publication in their newspapers in electronic databases without compensating the authors and obtaining their consent. Newspaper publishers have a copyright in their newspapers pursuant to the Copyright Act to "reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever". The court held that a substantial part of a newspaper may consist only of the original selection so long as the "essence" of the newspaper is preserved. In online databases, the originality of the freelance articles is reproduced but the originality of the newspaper is not. The resulting collective work is of a different nature than the original newspaper.
By contrast, the Court held that CD ROMs, which were essentially a compendium of daily newspaper editions, remained faithful to the essence of the original work - (that line could be a direct quote from Colonel Jack Ripper in Dr. Strangelove).
Regards,
Blair
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