The Supreme Court of Canada released this week its decision in a case overturning a ruling in which a court in Quebec had found a student leader guilty of contempt of court - Morasse v. Nadeau-Dubois 2016 SCC 44.
The background goes back to the spring of 2012, when massive and sustained student
protests took place in the province of Quebec over the issue of proposed increases
in university tuition fees. The increases were announced as part of the
budget introduced by the provincial government. Several student
organizations which were opposed to the increases organized protests.
The protests paralyzed several post-secondary
institutions. Classes at several institutions were cancelled.
Student organizations held votes declaring themselves to be “on strike”.
Picket lines were formed at several universities and CEGEPs. Students and
teachers were prevented from entering the buildings in which classes were to be
held. As a result, several injunctions were sought to resist these
blockages and help ensure the continuation of the school year.
At the time, the defendant Gabriel Nadeau-Dubois, was the spokesperson for
the Coalition large de L’Association pour une solidarite syndicaté etudiante (“CLASSE”).
CLASSE was one of the most active student organizations in Quebec.
It organized protests and picket lines in various post-secondary
institutions.
At the height of the protests, the plaintiff Jean-François Morasse was a
student in his final year at Laval University’s Faculty of Planning,
Architecture, Arts & Design. Mr. Morasse was completing a certificate
in visual arts. The Association des etudiants en arts plastiques de
L’Universite Laval (“ASETAP”), the organization representing students in
that program, held a strike vote and organized protests. On February 29,
2012, picket lines were erected to block the entrance to the building where Mr.
Morasse’s classes were held. Mr. Morasse instituted civil proceedings
against Laval University, ASETAP and another student organization and in April
of 2012 obtained a provisional interlocutory injunction for a 10 day period.
The injunction mandated free access to the facilities in which classes
for the visual arts program were held. It also ordered all persons who
were then boycotting classes to refrain from obstructing or otherwise blocking
access to classes by way of intimidation or through other actions likely to
have this effect.
Mr. Morasse brought an application to renew the injunction
after the initial 10 day period. A judge of the Quebec Superior Court
renewed the injunction through a safeguard order which was valid until
September of 2012. The judge’s order reaffirmed the prohibition to
obstruct or otherwise prevent access to classes but made no specific reference
to picketing generally. Eleven days after the court renewed the
injunction, in May of 2012, Mr. Nadeau-Dubois was interviewed by CBC’s French
television news network after one CEGEP resumed its regular schedule of classes
upon being ordered to do so by the Superior Court. Appearing with him was
Léo Bureau-Blouin, head of the Fédération etudiante collégiale du Québec, a
coalition representing student unions of Quebec’s CEGEPs and private
colleges. The interview was broadcast live throughout the province.
After the interview, Mr. Morasse filed a motion for contempt
against Mr. Nadeau-Dubois for his comments in the interview. Mr. Morasse
claimed that Mr. Nadeau-Dubois’ comments had violated a paragraph in the Superior
Court’s May 2012 order relating to refraining from instructing or impeding
access to classes by means of intimidation or from taking any action that could
prevent or adversely affect access to the classes in question. Mr.
Nadeau-Dubois had stated during the interview that such attempts to force
students back to class do not work, that a minority of students use the courts
to circumvent the majorities collective decision to go on strike, and that
picket lines are an entirely legitimate means to ensure respect of the vote to
strike.
Mr. Nadeau-Dubois was found guilty of contempt of court
under an article of the Quebec Civil Code and sentenced to 120 hours of
community service to be completed within six months under the supervision of a
probation officer.
The Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and
sentence and entered an acquittal.
The matter was further appealed to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada (6 –
3). The majority decision was written jointly by Chief Justice McLachlin
and Justice Abella. Separate but concurring reasons were written by
Justice Moldaver.
Justices McLachlin and Abella held that what is at issue is
whether a contempt charge brought by a private citizen against another
individual, meets the strict procedural and substantive safeguards required by
law to ensure that the liberty interest of those accused of contempt are fully
protected.
The power to find an individual guilty of contempt of court
is an exceptional one. It is an enforcement power of last resort and the
only civil proceeding in Quebec that may result in a penalty of
imprisonment. Because of the potential impact on an individual’s liberty,
the formalities for contempt proceedings must be strictly complied with.
The accused must be given clear, precise and unambiguous notice of a specific
contempt offence and the elements required for a conviction must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction for contempt should only be
entered where it is genuinely necessary to safeguard the administration of
justice.
The only allegations raised by Mr. Morasse against Mr.
Nadeau-Dubois related to an alleged violation of one paragraph in an injunction
order in the form of comments that Mr. Nadeau-Dubois had made in an
interview. Mr. Nadeau-Dubois was not given notice as to which specific
branch of the Civil Code, if any, he was being charged under. There was
no evidence that Mr. Nadeau-Dubois had knowledge, either actual or inferred, of
the order that the Superior Court had made. Knowledge could not be
imputed to Mr. Nadeau-Dubois on the basis of his comments during the interview,
questions he was asked or the statements other student leader had made.
His endorsement of students picketing in general did not amount to an
encouragement to use picket lines to block access to classes since the order
did not prohibit picketing altogether. Mr. Morasse’s failure to provide
Mr. Nadeau-Dubois’ actual or inferred knowledge of the order was dispositive of
the appeal.
In his occurring reasons, Justice Moldaver held that in the
television interview, Mr. Nadeau-Dubois intended to incite students at large to
breach any and all court orders which enjoined the use of picket lines to block
access to classes. Had the case proceeded on that basis, his call to
disobey at large would have included the injunction obtained by Mr. Morasse
regardless of whether or not he had specific knowledge of it. However,
the issue at trial was whether Mr. Nadeau-Dubois breached this particular
order. The Quebec Court of Appeal had found correctly that the evidence
did not support a finding that he had specific knowledge of the order that was in place and this
was fatal to the finding of contempt.
The dissenting judges were Justices Wagner, Cote and
Brown. Justice Wagner wrote those reasons. He held that the
purpose of convictions for contempt of court, whether in a civil or criminal
context is to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice and
ensure the smooth functioning of the courts. This power is exceptional
and must be exercised only as a last resort. Exercising it is nonetheless
justified where a contempt conviction is necessary to protect the integrity of
the justice system and ensure the systems credibility in the eyes of the
public.
In this case, Mr. Nadeau-Dubois knew full well that the
contempt charge he had to answer had been laid under two articles of the Civil
Code as could be seen from statements made by Mr. Morasse’s counsel and other
matters alleged by Mr. Morasse.
Specific knowledge of an order is not essential for the
purposes of the specific article under the Civil Code because actual personal
knowledge can always be inferred from circumstantial evidence. The
inference must be reasonable given the evidence or absence of evidence,
assessed logically and in the light of common sense and human experience.
The dissenting judges found that in this case a contextual
analysis of Mr. Nadeau-Dubois’ words could lead to only one reasonable
inference. When considering the context of the entire interview, those
words showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew of the existence, content
and scope of the orders and that he incited students to breach them.
Finally the dissenting judges held that the importance of
freedom of expression and the protection of that freedom in a democratic
society can never be overstated. But one may not use the exercise of
one’s freedom of expression as a pretext for inciting people to breach a court
order.
Regards,
Blair
